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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940369-CA 
v. : 
ROGER A. BLOMQUIST, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine) in a drug free zone, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 
and 58-37-8(5) (a) (1994); possession of a controlled substance 
(marijuana) in a drug free zone, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) and 58-37-8(5) (a) 
(1994). I 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the warrant authorizing the search of 
defendant's residence supported by probable cause? 
A magistrate's probable cause determination is given 
great deference on review. Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 236 
(1983). The affidavit supporting a search warrant application 
must, however, provide a "'substantial basis for determining the 
existence of probable cause.'" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 915 (1984) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239). The 
"substantial basis" requirement entails limited review of the 
magistrate's determination, asking only whether the affidavit 
contains sufficient factual information upon which a magistrate 
could have found probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. 
2. Assuming the search warrant affidavit was for some 
reason technically deficient, did the trial court properly admit 
the evidence seized from defendant's residence on the basis that 
the officers who conducted the search acted in good faith? 
This Court reviews de novo the question of whether an 
officer acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant. State 
v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1993). 
3. Was the stop, detainment and search of codefendant 
proper? 
These issues pertain only to codefendant. Defendant's 
appeal has not been consolidated with codefendant's appeal. See 
State v. Edenfield, Court of Appeals No. 940368-CA. Therefore, 
these issues do not present an issue for review in this case. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with three controlled substance 
violations, alleged to have occurred in a drug free zone, under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37-8(5)(a) (1994): 
possession of cocaine, a second degree felony; possession of 
marijuana, a third degree felony; and possession of xanax, a 
class A misdemeanor. Additionally, defendant was charged with 
possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-5(l) and 
58-37-8(5) (a) (1994) (R. 2-1).x 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized 
during a warrant-supported search of his home, alleging that the 
evidence was seized in violation of his federal and state 
constitutional rights.2 Following a hearing on the matter, the 
trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 51-45). 
Thereafter, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas 
to possession of cocaine and marijuana in a drug free zone, 
second and third degree felonies (R. 85-84) . The remaining 
misdemeanor counts were dismissed. Id. The trial court 
sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of one to 15 years 
for the second degree felony and to an indeterminate term of not 
more than 5 years for the third degree felony (R. 89, 114). The 
1
 The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
2
 The motion to suppress and supporting memorandum are 
located in the companion record of State v. Edenfield, Case No. 
940368-CA at R. 20-17, 36-24. 
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court then suspended execution of the prison terms and placed 
defendant on a 36 month probationary term. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Search Warrant Affidavit 
The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant 
affidavit (R. 12-8, a copy is attached as Addendum A). The 
affidavit was submitted by Sergeant Mike Blackhurst of the 
Pleasant Grove Police Department, an experienced narcotics 
investigator (R. 12-11) (copies of the search warrant, affidavit 
and return are attached as Addendum A), and had been reviewed by 
a county attorney (R. 14), see Addendum A. 
Sergeant Blackhurst sought a warrant to search 
defendant's home, his person and the person of defendant's 
girlfriend, codefendant Linda Edenfield and codefendant's 
Corvette for "controlled substances, paraphernalia, . . . buy/owe 
sheets, scales, and all other contraband associated with 
controlled substances" (R. 13), see Addendum A. 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant set 
forth information gleaned over an approximate eight month period, 
from September 1992 to March 11, 1993, when the search warrant 
was issued. Information was obtained from fellow officers, 
confidential and anonymous informants, court records and 
surveillance of defendant's residence. 
1. Confidential and Anonymous Informants 
In September 1992, Detective Leavitt received 
information from a confidential informant that defendant was 
4 
involved in the distribution of controlled substances (R. 11), 
see Addendum A. Detective Leavitt believed the information to be 
reliable because the informant had supplied reliable information 
concerning drug distribution on four previous occasions. Id. 
Five months later, on January 28, 1993, Sergeant 
Blackhurst received additional information from an anonymous 
informant who reported that codefendant "was driving to the Las 
Vegas area in a [t]an and [b]rown Chevrolete [sic] Corvette . . 
to pick up controlled substances to be delivered back to 
[defendant]" (R. 11) , see Addendum A. According to the 
anonymous informant, the "trips occur[red] approximately every 
two weeks, and [codefendant] carrie[d] a gun concealed in a 
compartment behind her seat." Id. 
On March 4, 1993, Sergeant Blackhurst received 
information from another anonymous informant who reported that 
he/she had overheard defendant speaking on the telephone and that 
defendant had stated that codefendant "would be delivering a load 
within the next five to six days" (R. 11), see Addendum A. 
2. Investigation and Surveillance 
Police confirmed that a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette with a 
Nevada State license plate was registered to codefendant (R. 9), 
see Addendum A. Police then began a periodic surveillance of 
defendant's residence on March 4, 1993 (R. 10), see Addendum A. 
Codefendant's Corvette was not observed at defendant's residence 
on that date; however, the Corvette was observed at defendant's 
residence seven days later, on March 11, 1994. Id. 
5 
Additionally, during the period of surveillance a 
vehicle registered to Linda lorg was observed at defendant's 
residence (R. 10) , see Addendum A. Sergeant Fox recalled that he 
had previously executed a search warrant at the lorg residence in 
1989 and that Iorg's son had been charged with several counts of 
distribution of controlled substances as a result of that search. 
Id. 
3. Corroborative Criminal Histories 
The affidavit also set forth defendant's criminal 
history which included a conviction for a controlled substance 
offense in March 1984 (R. 10), see Addendum A. Further, there 
was a misdemeanor warrant for defendant's arrest out of the 
Pleasant Grove City Court. Id. 
Codefendant's criminal history revealed that she had 
been charged but not convicted for controlled substance 
violations in 1988 and 1989. Id. 
B. Pre-warrant Stop and Detention 
On the basis of the foregoing, Sergeant Blackhurst 
requested authority to conduct a daytime search on the morning of 
March 11, 1993 (R. 14-13), see Addendum A. Prior to the 
warrant's issuance, at approximately 9:00 a.m., police began 
surveillance of defendant's house which was to continue up until 
Sergeant Blackhurst returned with the signed search warrant (Tr. 
Aug. 26, 1993 at 37, 50) .3 While police were watching the 
3
 The transcript is internally paginated and also stamped 
with record page numbers; citation to the transcript will be to 
the internal page numbers. 
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house, at approximately 10:30 a.m., defendants were observed 
leaving the house and driving off in defendant's pickup truck 
(Tr. 6) . 
When notified of the defendants' activity, Sergeant 
Blackhurst told the surveilling officers to stop them (Tr. 50). 
He further instructed that no action should be taken with regard 
to codefendant until the search warrant was signed (Tr. 37). 
Accordingly, a marked patrol car stopped defendant's pickup 
shortly after it left a nearby convenience store (Tr. 7). 
Defendant, who was driving the pickup, was immediately 
asked to step out of the pickup and was arrested on the 
outstanding misdemeanor warrant (Tr. 8). Codefendant was 
similarly requested to exit the pickup and was detained briefly 
until investigating officers could confirm that the search 
warrant had been signed (Tr. 8, 15). Because they were awaiting 
the search warrant at the time of the stop, several officers 
responded to assist (Tr. 13). Approximately three police 
vehicles were present, the marked car effecting the stop and two 
unmarked cars. No guns were drawn during the course of the stop 
(Tr. 14) . 
Approximately five minutes after the initial stop, 
Sergeant Blackhurst notified Officer Cullimore, who assisted in 
the stop, that the search warrant had been signed (Tr. 8, 16, 
38) .4 He further instructed that defendants should be 
4
 On signing the search warrant, Judge Dimick noted the 
time as 11:30 a.m. (R. 8), see Addendum A. Sergeant Blackhurst 
did not note the exact time the warrant was signed, but based on 
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transported to the jail and searched (Tr. 8). Sergeant 
Blackhurst then proceeded directly to defendant's house with the 
search warrant where he arrived in the next 10-15 minutes (Tr. 
39, 41, 51). Officer Harris, who was waiting at the house, noted 
that they had the search warrant in hand, at defendant's house, 
by 11:39 a.m. (Tr. 29-30). 
C. Search Results 
In the meantime, defendants' were transported and 
searched at the jail. No evidence was seized directly from 
either defendant's person; however, a search of codefendant's 
purse revealed methamphetamine (Tr. 18). The search of 
defendant's residence turned up numerous items of drug 
paraphernalia, pills, leafy and seed marijuana and cocaine 
crystals and residue. Drug paraphernalia was similarly seized 
from codefendant's Corvette (R. 15), see Addendum A. 
D. Motion to Suppress 
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized on the 
ground that the search warrant lacked probable cause in violation 
of federal and state constitutional provisions. In a supporting 
memorandum, defendants asserted that the affidavit failed to 
demonstrate the reliability of the one confidential and two 
anonymous informants; that the information was stale; and that 
his memory of the sequence of events, believed the judge was 
mistaken in his notation of the time (Tr. 41). In any event, 
Sergeant Blackhurst did not advise Officer Cullimore to take 
codefendant in for questioning until after the search warrant had 
been signed (Tr. 43). Officer Cullimore noted that Sergeant 
Blackhurst contacted and notified him that the warrant had been 
signed prior to 11:00 a.m. (Tr. 16). 
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the criminal histories of the defendants were irrelevant (R. 27-
23). In argument before the trial court, defense counsel focused 
primarily on the legality of the initial stop and detention of 
codefendant (Tr. 61-63). 
E. Denial of Motion to Suppress 
The trial court denied defendants7 motion on September 
15, 1993 (R. 43-38). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were filed on October 14, 1993 (R. 50-45). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In September of 1992, a detective of the 
Narcotics Enforcement Team received 
inf v_ nation from a trusted and reliable 
cor.ndential informant that Defendant Roger 
Blomquist was involved in the distribution 
and use of controlled substances. 
2. In January of 1993, a separate anonymous 
informant provided information that Linda 
Edenfield, the girlfriend of Roger Blomquist, 
was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown 
Chevrolet Corvette to obtain controlled 
substances to deliver back to Roger 
Blomquist. 
3. The anonymous informant said the trips 
occurred every two weeks and that Edenfield 
carried a gun concealed in a compartment 
behind her seat. 
4. In March of 1993, officers received 
information from a third informant who 
claimed to have overheard a telephone 
conversation in which Blomquist stated that 
Edenfield would be delivering a load with in 
the next five to six days. 
5. After receiving the information on March 
4, 1993, officers began surveillance of the 
residence of Blomquist and discovered that 
the tan and brown Corvette was not at the 
residence. 
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6. Periodic surveillance was continued until 
March 10, 1993. During the period of 
surveillance a vehicle registered to Linda 
Iorg was seen parked at the home. 
7. Iorg was arrested on several counts of 
controlled substances in 1989.5 Roger 
Blomquist was also found to have had a 
criminal record involving controlled 
substances with a conviction in March 1984. 
8. Officers determined that an active 
warrant for the arrest of Roger Blomquist 
existed out of the Pleasant Grove City Court. 
9. The name Linda Edenfield was also checked 
and it was determined that there were several 
narcotics related convictions appearing on 
the record.6 
10. A Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada 
license number 693EPS was registered to Linda 
Edenfield. 
11. On March 11, 1993, all of the 
information obtained by the officers was put 
together in an affidavit and taken to Judge 
Dimick of the Orem Circuit Court who executed 
a search warrant authorizing [a] search of 
the Blomquist residence, a 1981 Corvette 
registered to Linda Edenfield, the person of 
Linda Edenfield, and the person of Roger 
Blomquist. A copy of the search warrant and 
affidavit are attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference. 
12. On March 11, 1993, officers commenced 
surveillance of the Blomquist residence. 
Officer Blackhurst was in the process of 
acquiring the search warrant described above. 
While the Blomquist residence was under 
surveillance the [d]efendants, Linda 
5
 The Court's finding is inaccurate. lorg's home was the 
subject of a search warrant in 1989. Following the search, 
lorg's son was arrested on several drug related charges (R. 10), 
see Addendum A. 
€
 The Court's finding is inaccurate. The affidavit makes 
clear that codefendant had several controlled substance related 
arrests, but no convictions (R. 10), see Addendum A. 
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Edenfield and Roger Blomquist, left the 
residence and entered a vehicle owned by 
[d]efendant Blomquist. 
13. The Blomquist vehicle was stopped 
sometime around 10:30 a.m. Blomquist was 
arrested on the warrant and Edenfield was 
detained briefly until officers received 
information that the search warrant had been 
signed. 
14. Edenfield and Blomquist were then transported to 
the Pleasant Grove Police Department where Edenfield 
was searched pursuant to the warrant. 
15. Neither the Blomquist residence nor the 
Edenfield vehicle were searched until the 
search warrant was appropriately executed by 
Judge Dimick. 
16. The purse of Defendant Edenfield was 
with her when the vehicle was stopped and 
taken with her to the police station. The 
purse was part of her person and 
appropriately searched pursuant to the search 
warrant. 
17. The stop of Roger Blomquist and the 
execution of the arrest warrant and execution 
of the search warrant were essentially 
contemporaneous. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under the totality of the circumstances 
analysis the facts as established in the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant 
established adequate probable cause to 
support the search warrant issued. 
Information from separate sources was 
corroborative and consistent providing a 
sufficient basis for the magistrate to 
conclude that there was fair probability that 
the evidence sought would be found in the 
car, in the house, or on the person of the 
individuals described. 
2. The stop of the Blomquist vehicle and the 
temporary detention of the [d]efendants prior 
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to the physical arrival of the search warrant 
was appropriate because of the mobility of 
the [d]efendants and the likelihood that they 
may have had evidence upon their person. 
3. All officers involved in this operation 
acted in a good faith attempt to comply with 
the rules of Evidence and Constitution of the 
United States. Officers acted reasonably and 
prudently to prevent the loss or destruction 
of expected evidence without inappropriate 
intrusion upon the privacy of the suspects. 
4. The initial seizure of the person of 
Linda Edenfield was lawful under the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
5. The method employed by the officers was 
reasonable and employed in a reasonable 
manner in that the officers had an obvious 
and legitimate concern when the suspects left 
the home and entered a vehicle that evidence 
would leave with them. The immediate stop 
and detention without further search until 
they had received information that the search 
warrant being sought at the present time was 
executed was appropriate. No lesser 
intrusion would have preserved the evidence. 
No more intrusive action was undertaken until 
the fact that the warrant had been signed was 
confirmed. 
6. Police officers had received a valid 
search warrant based upon evidence 
independent of the stop and detention of 
Edenfield. Even if the search took place 
before the warrant was obtained the fact that 
a warrant was obtained made discovery of the 
evidence inevitable and the evidence should 
not be suppressed even if it were to be 
determined by this Court that the search took 
place before execution of the warrant. 
(R. 50-45) (a complete copy is attached as Addendum B). 
Four days after the filing of the above Findings and 
Conclusions, on October 18, 1993, defendant filed an objection 
thereto, essentially re-arguing the basis of his motion to 
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suppress (R. 62-57). Additionally, on October 22, 1993, 
defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling (R. 69-
63), based on State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion on November 
2, 1993, on the ground that Potter had not altered existing law 
regarding the issuance of search warrants (R. 72) (a copy is 
attached as Addendum C). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant 
Blackhurst's affidavit set forth a substantial basis for the 
magistrate to determine that there was current probable cause to 
search defendant's house for evidence of drug trafficking. 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Three independent 
informants implicated defendant and codefendant in a drug 
trafficking scheme operating out of defendant's residence. This 
information was corrobrated by independent police investigation 
including police observation of codefendant's suspected delivery 
of contolled substances to defendant's residence on the very day 
the search warrant was sought and obtained. 
Notwithstanding, should the Court conclude that the 
probable cause to search defendant's residence was not clearly 
articulated, any defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that 
police "had no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant 
was properly issued." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 
(1984) . None of the facial deficiencies that negate objective 
good faith exist here. Nor is this a case wherein the issuing 
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magistrate was mislead by knowingly or recklessly false 
information. Accordingly, police reliance on the warrant issued 
was objectively reasonable, and the deterrent purpose of the 
exclulsionary rule would not be served by excluding the 
challenged evidence. 
As for defendant's challenge to the propriety of the 
stop, detention and search of codefendant, these issues pertain 
only to codefendant. Defendant's appeal has not been 
consolidated with codefendant's appeal; therefore, these issues 
do not present an issue for review in this case. Moreover, 
defendant lacks standing to vicarously assert rights personal to 
another. State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 80 (Utah App. 1990) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED A 
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE MAGISTRATE'S 
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION 
The magistrate had a substantial basis for determining 
that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search 
warrant for defendant's residence.7 The affidavit was not 
rendered inadequate due to allegedly unreliable and stale 
7
 Although the warrant also authorized a search of 
defendant's person (R. 14), no incriminating evidence was found 
as a result of that search (R. 13), see Addendum A. Accordingly, 
the State addresses only the propriety of the warrant-supported 
search of defendant's residence wherein incriminating evidence 
was located. Id. 
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information.8 Quite the contrary, the affidavit set forth 
mutually reinforcing allegations obtained from three different 
informants, as well as corroborative information gained through 
independent police investigation. 
A, Informant Reliability 
An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge are factors to be considered in determining whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause exists. 
State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992). See 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983). However, "[t]hey 
are not strict, independent requirements to be "rigidly 
extracted' in every case." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). Rather, their 
significance varies under the circumstances of each case. 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (citing State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 
1205 (Utah 1984)). For example, "if the circumstances as a whole 
8
 Defendant broadly asserts that the instant warrant was 
an "anticipatory warrant." Br. of App. at 18-19, relying 
primarily on United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir. 
1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989). Garcia defines an 
anticipatory warrant as "a warrant that has been issued before 
the necessary events have occurred which will allow a 
constitutional search of the premises; if those events do not 
transpire, the warrant is void." 882 F.2d at 702. Cf. State v. 
Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 111-12 (Utah 1985) (discussing propriety of 
a preprepared affidavit). However, the present facts do not 
support defendant's claim; rather, all of the events set forth in 
Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit occurred prior to the affidavit's 
presentation to Judge Dimick (R. 15-8), see addendum A. See also 
Statement of Facts, supra. Consequently, defendant has not and 
cannot show that the instant warrant was in any way an 
"anticipatory warrant." Accordingly, the State responds solely 
to defendant's allegations concerning the adequacy of probable 
cause. 
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demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less 
strong showing is required." Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Such a 
circumstance is found when corroborative information is provided 
by multiple confidential informants. Even if an individual 
informant's information is inadequate by itself to establish 
probable cause, it may nonetheless help to establish probable 
cause when corroborated by additional independent sources. State 
v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah App. 1993). 
1. Three Independent and Corroborative 
Sources 
Accordingly, it is significant that three separate 
informants supplied information appearing in the present 
affidavit and that the information was mutually reinforcing and 
corroborative. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) 
("Corroboration through other sources of information reduce[s] 
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale"),9 overruled on 
other grounds, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) . Specifically, while the 
confidential informant simply reported that defendant was 
involved in drug trafficking, the anonymous informants 
corroborated that information with details implicating 
codefendant in the scheme. The first anonymous informant 
9
 See also United States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 103 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) ("fact that two apparently unassociated persons make 
the same assertion increases the probability that it is true"); 
United States v. Landis, 726 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1984) 
("Interlocking tips from different confidential informants 
enhance the credibility of each."), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1230 
(1984); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 863 (5th Cir. 1978) 
("When three unreliable but unconnected persons all report the 
same fact, it is probable that the fact is true.") 
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reported that codefendant made biweekly drug runs to Las Vegas in 
her Corvette and the second anonymous informant reported when 
codefendant would deliver the next load to defendant's residence 
(R. 11), see Addendum A. Due to the interlocking nature of the 
tips, the issuing magistrate reasonably relied upon the reports 
in his probable cause determination. Id. 
2. Informant's Provided Nothing in Exchange 
for Information 
Notwithstanding corroboration between the three 
reports, the reliability and/or basis of knowledge of the 
informants is otherwise demonstrated. For example, the 
informants did not receive anything in exchange for their 
information. This Court has previously recognized that when a 
confidential informant receives nothing in exchange for his/her 
information, the magistrate properly assumes the information is 
reliable. State v. Viah, 871 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah App. 1994). 
Cf. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 ("reliability and veracity are 
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives 
nothing from the police in exchange for the information"). 
3. Confidential Informant Previously Reliable 
Referring particularly to the reliability of the 
confidential informant, his/her reliability is established by the 
fact that he\she had provided reliable information on four 
previous occasions. Hanse^. 732 P.2d at 130; State v. Anderton, 
668 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1983) (indicating an informant has 
previously provided truthful information is an accepted method 
for establishing veracity). 
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4. Anonymous Informants Provided Insider Details 
Additionally, the reliability of the anonymous 
informants is enhanced by the insider nature of their 
information. The first anonymous informant was able to supply 
details of the drug trafficking scheme including a description of 
codefendant's Corvette, the frequency and purpose of her drug 
runs to Las Vegas, and her ultimate delivery of the controlled 
substances to defendant (R. 11), see Addendum A. The informant's 
knowledge of codefendant's travel habits reasonably suggests that 
the information was obtained either from codefendant or from 
someone codefendant trusted and was therefore reliable.10 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 245; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
The same can be said for information reported by the 
second anonymous informant who personally overheard defendant 
state when he expected codefendant to deliver the next "load." 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (informant's personal observation of 
criminality is adequate to establish basis of knowledge). 
10
 Indeed, at the suppression hearing, Sergeant Blackhurst 
testified that he later found out that the first anonymous 
informant was codefendant's ex-boyfriend (Tr. 46-47). He 
explained that this information was not included in the affidavit 
because it was not known at that time the affidavit was prepared. 
Id. 
On appeal, defendant repeatedly suggests that the ex-
boyfriend's tip was unreliable because it was motivated by anger, 
hostility or revenge. Br. of App. at 21-22. Defendant's 
assertions lack record support and/or legal analysis and should 
not be considered here. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 
(Utah 1986) (assertions of error that are unsupported by the 
record or relevant authority not ordinarily considered on 
appeal); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) ("This 
Court cannot rule on matters outside the trial court record."). 
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B. Independent Verification and 
Corroboration of Significant Facts 
1. Police Investigation and Surveillance 
Informant reliability is also enhanced by independent 
police investigation and corroboration of significant facts. 
Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. In the 
present case, police verified that the described Corvette was in 
fact registered to codefendant (R. 9), see Addendum A. Police 
also observed the Corvette at defendant's residence within 24 
hours of its estimated arrival time (R. 10), see Addendum A. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (because an informant is shown to be right 
about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he 
has alleged including the claim that the object of the tip is 
engaged in criminal activity). 
Further, approximately nine days prior to the warrant's 
issuance, police observed a vehicle at defendant's residence 
belonging to Linda Iorg (R. 10), see Addendum A. Iorg's house 
had been the subject of a search warrant for drugs in 1989, which 
search lead to the arrest of Iorg's son on several charges of 
drug distribution. Id. 
2. Criminal History 
The defendants' criminal histories provided additional, 
independent corroboration of the informants' allegations. A 
check of defendant's criminal history revealed a prior drug 
related conviction in 1984 (R. 11), see Addendum A. 
Codefendant's criminal history similarly revealed a history of 
drug related arrests in 1988-89. Id. 
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In United States v. Harris, the United States Supreme 
Court considered the corroborative purposes of a suspect's 
criminal reputation in a search warrant affidavit. 4 03 U.S. 573, 
581-83 (1971). The Court made clear that while a suspect's 
"reputation, standing alone, was insufficient" to establish 
probable cause; reputation was relevant to the probable cause 
determination "when supported by other information." Id. at 583. 
Accordingly, the Court declined to interpret its prior cases as 
prohibiting the use of such "probative information." Id. 
Rather, the Court concluded that it was entirely proper for a 
magistrate to rely upon the affiant's knowledge of a suspect's 
reputation in assessing probable cause. Id. 
We cannot conclude that a policeman's 
knowledge of a suspect's reputation -
something that policemen frequently know and 
a factor that impressed such a "legal 
technician" as Mr. Justice Frankfurter - is 
not a "practical consideration of everyday 
life" upon which an officer (or a magistrate) 
may properly rely in assessing the 
reliability of an informant's tip. 
Id. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 271 (discussed in Harris, wherein 
Frankfurter, J., writing for the majority, held that information 
"that [Jones] was a known user of narcotics made the charge (drug 
trafficking) against him much less subject to sceptism than would 
be such a charge against one without such a history")). Utah's 
appellate court's have similarly held. See e.g. Bailey, 675 P.2d 
at 1204, 1206 (police verification of Bailey's prior convictions 
for burglary and auto theft enhanced reliability of confidential 
informant's allegation that Bailey was involved in current 
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burglary and theft); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah App. 
1993) (confidential informant's allegations of suspect's 
involvement in drug trafficking found to "mesh" with affiant 
officer's knowledge of suspect's "histcry of substance abuse and 
sales"); State v. Buford. 820 P.2d 1381, 1385 (1991) (affidavit 
held to sufficiently establish named informant's reliability 
where informant accurately detailed Buford's prior criminal 
history of illegal drug use and sale)-11 But Cf. Viah, 871 P.2d 
at 1031; State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993); 
State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (all overlooking corroborative nature of 
suspect's criminal history and holding criminal history not 
properly part of probable cause determination). 
C. Current Probable Cause 
Defendant disputes that the foregoing information 
supports a finding of current probable cause. He complains both 
about the seven months between the initial incriminating tip and 
11
 Accord Comonwealth v. Spano, 605 N.E.2d 1241, 1243, 45-
46 (Mass. 1993) (defendant's 1978 narcotic conviction held 
corroborative of informant's tip concerning defendant's 
involvement in drug trafficking scheme); Malcolm v. State, 550 
A.2d 670, 671, 675 (Md. 1988) (suspect's 1980 narcotic conviction 
held to corroborate informant's allegations of drug trafficking); 
State v. Amerman 581 A.2d 19, 30-31 (Md. App. 1990) (threefold 
purpose for including suspect's criminal history in search 
warrant affidavit is to: 1) demonstrate suspect's tendency to 
engage in related criminality; 2) independently corroborate 
informant's allegations of suspect's involvement in related 
offense; 3) demonstrate ongoing nature of suspect's involvement 
in continuous criminal enterprise); People v. Keller, 505 
N.Y.S.2d 802, 806-07 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 1986) (arson suspect's prior 
arson arrests deemed relevant consideration in determining 
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant). 
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the issuance of a search warrant, and about the relevance of his 
nine year old drug-related conviction. Due, however, to the 
significant fact that the search warrant was sought and executed 
on the very day codefendant was suspected to have delivered a 
load of controlled substances to defendant's residence, 
defendant's staleness challenge must fail. 
As recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, 
Staleness issues usually arise when a 
significant lapse of time occurs between the 
discovery of information suggesting that 
evidence of the crime can be found at a 
particular locale and the magistrate's 
finding of probable cause or the execution of 
the warrant. The concern is whether so much 
time has passed that there is no longer 
probable cause to believe that the evidence 
is still at the targeted locale. 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). Defendant fails to demonstrate any such significant 
lapse of time in this case. 
Police first began receiving reports of defendant's 
involvement in drug trafficking in September 1992 (R. 11), see 
Addendum A. Five months later, an anonymous informant provided 
additional details concerning codefendant's involvement, 
including her ongoing and biweekly trips to Nevada to purchase 
controlled substances. Id. On March 3, 1993, approximately nine 
days before the warrant was sought, police observed the Iorg 
vehicle (persons known to be involved in controlled substances), 
at defendant's residence (R. 10), see Addendum A. One day later, 
on March 4, 1993, Sergeant Blackhurst heard from yet another 
anonymous informant who reported that defendant expected 
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codefendant's next "load" to be delivered on or about March 10, 
1993 (R. 11), see Addendum A. Then, on March 11, 1993, 
codefendant's Corvette was observed at defendant's residence (R. 
10), see Addendum A. With the foregoing information set forth in 
an affidavit, Sergeant Blackhurst sought a search warrant that 
very morning. Because defendant cannot show a significant lapse 
of time between the observation of codefendant's Corvette at his 
residence and the warrant's issuance, defendant's staleness 
challenge fails. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260. See also Singleton, 
854 P.2d at 1017-18, 1021 (approving search warrant obtained 
approximately 5 weeks after receipt of most recent incriminating 
evidence) .12 
Further, the affidavit alleges more than just an 
isolated incident of criminality. United States v. Johnson, 461 
F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972) ("where the affidavit properly 
recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous 
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less 
significant" to the determination of current probable cause). 
12
 Accord United States v. Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2nd 
Cir. 1990) (continuous nature of narcotics conspiracies precludes 
staleness challenge to affidavit based on approximate 18 month 
delay between procuring informant's statements and obtaining 
search warrant); United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 597 
(1st Cir. 1985) (approving affidavit alleging defendants' 
involvement in marijuana distribution one year earlier); Gardner 
v. State, 567 A.2d 404, 410-411 (Del. 1989) (rejecting staleness 
challenge to affidavit based on 10 month hiatus between anonymous 
tip alleging defendant's drug activity and date search warrant 
was issued), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990); State v. 
Grimshaw, 515 A.2d 1201, 1204 (N.H. 1986) (affirming probable 
cause determination based on informant's allegation of 
defendant's drug possession approximately seven months prior to 
affidavit). 
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Rather, the affidavit sets forth an ongoing pattern of criminal 
activity; particularly, codefendant's biweekly drug runs to Las 
Vegas. As acknowledged by this Court, drug trafficking is widely 
recognized as a protracted and ongoing type of criminal 
enterprise. Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021 (citing, United States 
v. Feola. 651 F.Supp. 1068, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that 
drug distribution schemes "are the very paradigm of the 
continuing enterprises for which courts have relaxed the temporal 
requirements of non-staleness"), aff'd. 875 F.2d 857 (2d. Cir.), 
cert, denied, Marin v. United States, 493 U.S. 834 (1989)). 
Accordingly, in addition to its corroborative purposes, see Part 
B, supra, defendant's prior drug related conviction is properly 
used to demonstrate that his involvement with controlled 
substances has been continuous over the years and was ongoing at 
the time of the warrant. State v. Stromberg. 783 P.2d 54, 55-57 
(Utah App. 1989) (approximately eight year old conviction for 
unlawful possession held to support determination that Stromberg 
was involved in an ongoing pattern of marijuana use), cert. 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, a common 
sense reading of Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit suggests that 
there was probable cause to search defendant's residence. The 
trial court thus properly applied the highly deferential 
standards of review in examining the magistrate's determination 
of probable cause. It correctly rejected defendant's arguments 
that the information received from three independent informants 
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was not reliable and was also stale in favor of the conclusion 
that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that 
there was a fair probability that evidence of the defendants' 
drug distribution scheme would be found inside defendant's 
residence. Given the "Fourth Amendment's strong preference for 
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant," Gates, 462 U.S. at 
236, this Court should similarly conclude that the magistrate had 
sufficient foundation for determining that probable cause 
existed. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS DEFECTIVE, 
POLICE EXERCISED GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON THE 
WARRANT 
Even if this Court were to conclude that Sergeant 
Blackhurst's affidavit was for some reason inadequate, the 
evidence seized would still be admissible under the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and the trial court so ruled (R. 46), 
see Addendum B.13 
Leon avoids suppression of evidence seized pursuant to 
a subsequently-invalidated search warrant, provided that officers 
13
 Defendant did not develop a state constitutional 
analysis of the good faith issue in the trial court, nor has he 
done so on appeal. Therefore, in the event the Court deems it 
necessary to reach this issue, the Court's analysis "must proceed 
solely under federal constitutional law." State v. Horton, 848 
P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1993). See State v. Collard. 810 P.2d 
884, 885 n.2 (Utah App. 1991) (Utah apppellate courts "will not 
engage in a state constitutional analysis unless a party briefs a 
different analysis under the state constitution than that which 
flows from the federal Constitution."). 
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conducting the search believed in good faith the warrant was 
valid. Further, the Leon exception to suppression requires that 
reliance on the defective warrant be objectively reasonable. 
Only then is the seized evidence admissible: 
In the absence of an allegation that the 
magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral 
role, suppression is appropriate only if the 
officers were dishonest or reckless in 
preparing their affidavit or could not have 
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in 
the existence of probable cause. 
Id. at 926. 
Although defendant has not expressly challenged the 
good faith of the officers relying on the warrant, he does 
attempt to analogize the instant affidavit to that in State v. 
Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989). The Droneburg 
affidavit relied solely on information obtained from one 
confidential informant. Id. at 13 03. Athough the informant had 
previously provided reliable information, his/her assertion was 
vague and conclusory, consisting of the bare allegation that 
controlled substances would be delivered to a residence in 
Panguitch, Utah, between between the hours of 2:00 and 4:00 a.m.. 
Id. The affidavit was devoid of any corroborative information. 
Id. Because the Dronebura affidavit was "so lacking in indicia 
of probable cause" the State conceded "it was unreasonable for 
the officer who prepared the affidavit to rely on a warrant 
issued on the strength of it." Id. at 1305. 
The instant affidavit is distinguishable from the ill-
fated Droneburg affidavit. Sergeant Blackhurst's affidavit set 
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forth mutually reinforcing and incriminating information gleaned 
from three different informants, as well as significant 
corroborating information obtained through independent police 
investigation. See Part B, supra. Even if Sergeant Blackhurst's 
affidavit failed in some way to clearly articulate probable 
cause, it was not so inadequate that police could not have acted 
in objectively reasonable reliance on the search warrant that was 
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. None of the facial 
deficiencies that negate objective good faith exist here. Leon, 
468 U.S. at 923, 926. Nor is this a case wherein the issuing 
magistrate was mislead by knowingly or recklessly false 
information, or otherwise failed to perform his neutral and 
detached function. Id.; State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Consequently, any 
defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that police "had no 
reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly 
issued." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Therefore, police reliance on 
the warrant issued was objectively reasonable and the deterrent 
purpose of the exclulsionary rule would not be served by 
excluding the challenged evidence. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT CHALLENGES THE PROPRIETY OF THE 
STOP, DETENTION AND SEARCH OF CODEFENDANT; 
HOWEVER, DEFENDANT'S APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN 
CONSOLIDATED WITH CODEFENDANT'S APPEAL AND HE 
LACKS STANDING TO VICARIOUSLY ASSERT ISSUES 
PERSONAL TO CODEFENDANT 
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that the 
stop, detainment and search of codefendant was not authorized by 
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the warrant or by exigent circumstances. Br. of App. at 25-2 8. 
These issues relate only to codefendant. Indeed, with reference 
to his own case, defendant concedes the validity of the stop. 
Br. of App. at 27. Defendant's appeal has not been consolidated 
with that of codefendant. See State v. Edenfield, Utah Court of 
Appeals No. 94 0368. Moreover, defendant lacks standing to 
challenge the propriety of these actions on codefendant's 
behalf;14 nor does he attempt to so argue. See Br. of App. at 
25-28. Rather, it appears that defense counsel, who represents 
both defendant and codefendant, has filed identical briefs for 
each defendant and therein included points relevant to only one 
or the other defendant. Compare Br. of Appellant Edenfield, Case 
No. 940368 at 25-28. Accordingly, the State does not here 
respond to the issues raised in defendant's Point II which are 
relevant only to codefendant. The State will instead respond to 
the identical argument in its responsive brief in codefendant's 
appeal, Edenfield, Case No. 940368-CA. 
14
 See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 80 (Utah App. 1990) 
(fourth amendment rights are personal rights which may not be 
vicariously asserted), denial of Habeas Corpus aff'd, 853 P.2d 
898 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 p.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the 
denial of the motion to suppress and affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
CARLYLE K. BRYSON, #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JAMES R. TAYLOR, #3199 
Deputy County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84611 
Telephone 801-370-8026 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, EX PARTE 
IN THE MATTER OF 
SEARCH WARRANT 
A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION : 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY POLICE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Magistrate's It has been established by oath or 
Endorsement affirmation made or submitted to me 
this 11th day of March, 1993, that there 
is probable cause to believe the fol-
lowing: 
_^'" 1. The property described below: 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense or is 
evidence of illegal conduct. 
£^ 2. The property described below is most probably located 
upon the person or at the premises also set forth below. 
[^ 3. The person or entity in possession of the property is 
a party to the alleged illegal conduct. 
NOW THEREFORE, YOU AHD EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to 
conduct a search of the following described premises and persons: 
The persons of Roger Blomquist and Linda Edinfield. The 
residence of the suspect(s), located at 126 South main Pleasant 
Grove and surrounding curtledge and outbuildings. The residence is 
more specifically described as a white stucco single family 
dwelling on the West side of main street in Pleasant Grove facing 
East. The residence has a dirt driveway of the North side and is 
the first residence south of the intersection of 100 North main 
street. There is a white brick unattached garage behind the 
residence on the West side. 
The suspects vehicle that is described as a 1981 Chevrolet 
Corvette bearing Nevada License plate #693 EPS. The vehicle is 
registered to Linda Edinfield. 
You are directed to search for the presence of controlled 
substances, paraphernalia used in the unlawful distribution or use 
of controlled substances, buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other 
contraband associated with controlled substances. 
THIS WARRANT HAY BE SERVED: 
IN THE DAYTIME 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring 
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the 
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You 
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person 
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where 
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with 
a written inventory of any seized evidence, identifying the place 
where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE 
UF ISSUANCE. 
Dated this \A day of ^ f e ^ l 9 9 2 at J/^^%^f^^: 
M a g i'B « r tft e Y^Ks^**^, ".' \„ •" 
3S=L" 
-U" 
• f 
CIRCUIT COURT, PROVO DEPARTHENT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
) IH SUPPORT OF AND NOTION 
STATE OF UTAH, ) FOR A SEARCH WARRANT 
-VS- ) 
) Case No. 
IN THE MATTER OF A ) 
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
1. MIKE BLACKHURST , Being first duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and says: 
2. That I am a police officer for the Pleasant Grove 
Police Department, Pleasant Grove, Utah County, Utah. 
3. That I have been employed as a Policeman for the past 
twenty four years and that I am currently assigned to the Utah 
County Narcotics Task force. I have received training from the Utah 
State Police Officers Standards and Training Academy, the Utah Drug 
academy, and the DEA drug academy. This training covered all 
aspects of drug enforcement and included substance identification, 
confidential informants, undercover operations, controlled buys, 
undercover drug buys, drafting search warrants, executing search 
warrants, and all other areas of drug enforcement. 
1 have had experience in making undercover drug buys, writing and 
their information, and conducting surveillance. 
4. That in September of 1992, Detective Aundre Leavitt 
recieved information from a confidential informant that Roger 
Blomquist's was involved in the distribution and use of controlled 
substances. 
b. That this same confidential informant has supplied 
information on as many as four individuals who were involved in the 
distribution of controlled substances and that this information has 
been proven to be reliable through other investigative methods. 
6. That on January 28th, 1993, your affiant received 
information from an anonymous informant who said that that Linda 
Edinfield, the girlfriend of Roger Blomquist, was driving to the 
Las Vegas area in a Tan and Brown Chevrolete Corvette. The 
anonymous informant stated that the reason for these trips was to 
pick up controlled substances to be delivered back to Roger 
blomquist. These trips occur approximately every two weeks, and 
that Linda carries a gun concealed in a compartment behind her 
seat. 
7. That on March 4th, 1993, your affiant received 
information from a different anonymous informant who stated that a 
telephone conversation had been overheard in which Roger Blomquist 
stated that Linda Edinfield would be delivering a load within the 
next five to six days. 
8. That with the above information on March 4th, 1993, 
surveillance was conducted at the residence of Roger Blomquist and 
it was discovered that the Tan and Brown Corvette was not at the 
residence. Periodic surveillance was conducted to watch for the 
arrival of the Corvette and it did arrive on March 11th, 1993. 
9. That during the periodic surveillance Sergeant Lee Fox 
observed a vehicle parked at the Blomquist residence on March 3rd, 
1993. This vehicle was bearing Utah License plate #942 BHN, and was 
registered to Linda Iorg. Sergeant Fox recalled that he had 
conducted a serach warrant on the Iorg residence in 1989 wherein 
the son of Linda Iorg was arrested on several counts of 
distribution of controlled substance. 
10. That a records check was conducted on both Roger 
Blomquist and his girlfriend Linda Edinfield. It was found that 
Roger Blomquist has a criminal record involving controlled 
substances with a conviction in March of 1984. It was also 
discovered that there was a misdemeanor warrant for his arrest out 
of the Pleasant Grove City Court. 
11. That the records check of Linda Edinfield revealed 
that she has a criminal history indicating that she has been 
charged but never convicted with two counts of possession of 
cocaine in 1988, and two counts of possession of controlled 
substance in 1989. 
12. That the vehicle Linda Edinfield is driving is more 
specifically described as a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada 
License plate #693 EPS. The vehicle is registered to Linda 
Edinfield. 
13J That the residence of Roger Blomquist is located at 
126 South Main in Pleasant Grove and is more specifically described 
as a white stucco single family dwelling on the West side of main 
street in Pleasant Grove facing East. The residence has a dirt 
driveway of the North side and is the first residence south of the 
intersection of 100 North main street. There is a white brick 
unattached garage behind the residence on the West side. 
14. That it is your affiants experience that subjects who 
deal in controlled substance wil commonly keep other items 
associated with their drug business in their possession. These 
items include drug paraphernalia, buy/owe sheets, scales, drug 
money, or any other items that would facilitate their drug deals. 
15. That it is your affiants experience that those who 
deal in controlled substance will often conceal their drugs outside 
of their residence upon the curtledge of their property. 
16. That the materials sought by this application for a 
search and seizure warrant are being held in violation of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act and are evidence of felonious drug crime, 
wherefore, your affiant respectfully requests that the Court issue 
its warrant for the search at any time of the day of the residence 
described above, and the person of the suspects, Roger Blomquist 
and Linda Edinfield, for the presence therein of controlled 
substances, paraphernalia used in the unlawful distribution or use 
of controlled substances, buy/owe sheets, scales, and all other 
contraband associated with controlled substances. 
MIKE BLACKHURST 
AFFIANT 
Subscribed and eworn to before me this 11th day gf^gorgh,, 1993, at 
1/130 hrs. 
SEARCH WARRANT RETURN 
STATE OF UTAH ) "",1 '" <- ' ' ;" ^ rfdZ-^ffl 
)ss / v 
COUNTY OF UTAH )
 ;/^/ 7^ 4 
INVENTORY OF PROPERTY TAKEN FROM THE RESIDENCE OF ROGER BLOMQUIS'Tp 
126 South Main, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on March 11, 1993, "l>y 
authority of within SEARCH WARRANT issued by JUDGE DIMMICK, Circuit 
Court Judge, County of Utah, 1993. 
1. Small metal can with rolling papers, 2 baggies containing 
marijuana, cigarette lighter and scissors. 
2. Razor blade, glass tube with white crystals, glass pipe, 
rolled up in a white towel. 
3. Pill in cigarette cellophane. 
4. Cigarette cellophane with 3 brown pills. 
5. Scales, hemostats, pipe, wire, 3 plastic funnels and marijuana 
seeds• 
6. Hemostat. 
7. Round red tin can containing wooden pipe, white pills in 
cellophane. 
8. 2 straws in Corvette passenger seat. 
9. Marijuana roach, in Corvette passenger seat. 
10. 2 cigarette cellophane packages with marijuana seeds. 
11. Brown vial with white residue. 
I, SGT. MIKE BLACKHURST, the police officer by whom this 
warrant was executed, do swear that I 
and the above inventory contains a true 
of all property taken by me on the said 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 
1993. 
ADDENDUM B 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 370-8026 
F5LED 
Fourth Judical District Court 
of Utah County, State of Uta.1* 
, CARMA p. SMITH, Cferk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH# 
VS, 
Plaintiff, 
ROGER A. BLOMQUIST, and 
LINDA ANN EDENFIELD, 
Defendant(s) . 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
^ase No. $314003£. FS 
~e No. S31000385^S 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Boyd L. Park 
presiding on the 26th day of August, 1993. The Defendants were 
present in person and represented by Attorney Shelden R. Carter. 
The Plaintiff was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, James 
R. Taylor. The Court having heard the evidence in this matter and 
issued a Memorandum Decision does make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In September of 1992, a detective of the Narcotics 
Enforcement Team received information from a trusted and reliable 
confidential informant that Defendant Roger Blomquist was involved 
in the distribution and use of controlled substances. 
2. In January of 1993, a separate anonymous informant 
provided information that Linda Edenfield, the girlfriend of Roger 
m> 
DO 
Blomquist, was driving to Las Vegas in a tan and brown Chevrolet 
Corvette to obtain controlled substances to deliver back to Roger 
Blomquist. 
3. The anonymous informant said the trips occurred every two 
weeks and that Edenfield carried a gun concealed in a compartment 
behind her seat. 
4. In March of 1993, officers received information from a 
third informant who claimed to have overheard a telephone 
conversation in which Blomquist stated that Edenfield would be 
delivering a load within the next five to six days. 
5. After receiving the information on March 4, 1993, officers 
began surveillance of the residence of Blomquist and discovered 
that the tan and brown Corvette was not at the residence. 
6. Periodic surveillance was continued until March 10, 1993. 
During the period of surveillance a vehicle registered to Linda 
Iorg was seen parked at the home. 
7. Iorg was arrested on several counts of controlled 
substances in 1989. Roger Blomquist was also found to have had a 
criminal record involving controlled substances with a conviction 
in March of 1984. 
8. Officers determined that an active warrant for the arrest 
of Roger Blomquist existed out of the Pleasant Grove City Court. 
9. The name Linda Edenfield was also checked and it was 
determined that there were several narcotics related convictions 
2 
appearing on the record. 
10. A Chevrolet Corvette bearing Nevada, license number 693EPS 
was registered to Linda Edenfield. 
11. On March 11, 1993, all of the information obtained by the 
officers was put together in an affidavit and taken to Judge Dimick 
of the Orem Circuit Court who executed a search warrant authorizing 
search of the Blomquist residence, a 1981 Corvette registered to 
Linda Edenfield, the person of Linda Edenfield, and the person of 
Roger Blomquist. A copy of the search warrant and affidavit are 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 
12. On March 11, 1993, officers commenced surveillance of the 
Blomquist residence. Officer Blackhurst was in the process of 
acquiring the search warrant described above. While the Blomquist 
residence was under surveillance the Defendants, Linda Edenfield 
and Roger Blomquist, left the residence and entered a vehicle owned 
by Defendant Blomquist. 
13. The Blomquist vehicle was stopped sometime around 10:30 
a.m. Blomquist was arrested on the warrant and Edenfield was 
detained briefly until officers received information that the 
search warrant had been signed. 
14. Edenfield and Blomquist were then transported to the 
Pleasant Grove Police Department where Edenfield was searched 
pursuant to the warrant. 
15. Neither the Blomquist residence nor the Edenfield vehicle 
3 
were searched until the search warrant was appropriately executed 
by Judge Dimick. 
16. The purse of Defendant Edenfield was with her when the 
vehicle was stopped and taken with her to the police station. The 
purse was part of her person and appropriately searched pursuant to 
the search warrant• 
17. The stop of Roger Blomguist and the execution of the 
arrest warrant and execution of the search warrant were essentially 
contemporaneous. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under the totality of the circumstances analysis the facts 
as established in the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
established adequate probable cause to support the search warrant 
issued. Information from separate sources was corroborative and 
consistent providing a sufficient basis for the Magistrate to 
conclude that there was fair probability that the evidence sought 
would be found in the car, in the house, or on the person of the 
individuals described. 
2. The stop of the Blomquist vehicle and the temporary 
detention of the Defendants prior to the physical arrival of the 
search warrant was appropriate because of the mobility of the 
4 
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Defendants and the likelihood that they may have had evidence upon 
their person. 
3. All officers involved in this operation acted in a good 
faith attempt to comply with the Rules of Evidence and Constitution 
of the United States. Officers acted reasonably and prudently to 
prevent the loss or destruction of expected evidence without 
inappropriate intrusion upon the privacy of the suspects. 
4. The initial seizure of the person of Lir*u~ Edenfield was 
lawful under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
5. The method employed by the officers was reasonable and 
employed in a reasonable manner in that the officers had an obvious 
and legitimate concern when the suspects left the home and entered 
a vehicle that evidence would leave with them. The immediate stop 
and detention without further search until they had received 
information that the search warrant being sought at the present 
time was executed was appropriate. No lesser intrusion would have 
preserved the evidence. No more intrusive action was undertaken 
until the fact that the warrant had been signed was confirmed. 
6. Police officers had received a valid search warrant based 
upon evidence independent of the stop and detention of Edenfield. 
Even if the search took place before the warrant was obtained the 
fact that a warrant was obtained made discovery of the evidence 
inevitable and the evidence should not be suppressed even if it 
were to be determined by this Court that the search took place 
5 
before execution of the warrant. 
DATED this / / day of October, 1993. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SHELDEN R. CARTER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
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Utah Courtot Appeal 
Marilyn M- Branch 
cferkof the Court 
ADDENDUM C 
rH
 D.'S 
STA7r < 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA ANN EDENFIELD and 
ROGER A. BLOMQUIST 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 931400385 & 386 
DATE: November 2, 1993 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
CLERK: LHH 
This matter came before the Court Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling. 
Defendants contend the case of State v. Potter, 221 Ut. Adv. Reports 29, compels this 
court to rule differently regarding Defendants' Motion to Suppress. This court issued its 
Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Motion to Suppress on September 15, 1993. 
The court having read the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Response and the case of State v. Potter, and being fully advised in the 
premises now makes the following: 
RULING 
(1) Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling is denied. This court does not 
believe Potter alters the existing law in this state regarding search warrants. 
Dated this 2nd day of November, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Shelden Carter, Esq. 
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O l A l t l U r u i n n 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J A N G R A H A M 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV 1 5 1994 
Marilyn M.Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
CAROL CLAWSON 
Solicitor General 
REED RICHARDS 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
PALMER DEPAULIS 
Director of Public Policy & Communications 
November 15, 1994 
Marilyn Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Edenfield. Case No. 940368-CA, 
and State v. Blomauist. Case No, 940369-CA. 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
Since the filing of the State's responsive briefs in 
these matters, pertinent and significant authority has come to my 
attention concerning the issue set out in the State's Edenfield 
brief at Point II (B) (2), pp. 26-28, and in the State's Blomauist 
brief at Point 1(B)(2), pp. 19-21. The State cites as 
supplemental authority, State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365-66 
(Utah App. 1987). 
This supplemental authority is submitted pursuant to 
rule 24 (i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Sincerely, 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Shelden R. Carter 
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